Sudan’s Al-Burhan Faces Defining Test Over RSF’s Political Future

UNITED STATES—The army chief must balance international pressure for negotiations with Sudanese demands that the paramilitary force not be rewarded with political power

As international efforts continue to seek an end to Sudan’s devastating war, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan faces one of the most consequential decisions of his leadership: whether a political settlement can end the fighting without returning the Rapid Support Forces to power.

Al-Burhan, commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces and chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, is under pressure from international mediators to reach an agreement with the RSF. At the same time, many Sudanese activists, civil society representatives and families affected by the war are demanding that the paramilitary organization be denied any role in the country’s future government unless there is meaningful accountability for the atrocities attributed to its forces.

Reliable nationwide opinion polling is nearly impossible during a war that has displaced millions of people and disrupted communications across much of the country. Nevertheless, opposition to the RSF’s political rehabilitation appears widespread among Sudanese communities that have endured killings, sexual violence, looting, occupation and forced displacement.

For al-Burhan, the issue is larger than the terms of a ceasefire. It concerns whether an armed organization accused of grave abuses should be allowed to use battlefield power as leverage to secure positions in Sudan’s next government.

The position taken by the army-led government reflects that concern. In its response to a recent American peace proposal, the government accepted much of the proposed framework, including a humanitarian truce, negotiations toward a permanent ceasefire and an eventual civilian-led transition. It objected, however, to provisions that would have required only limited RSF withdrawals.

Sudanese authorities instead demanded that the RSF withdraw from all cities it has occupied since May 2023. That position places al-Burhan between the international desire for a rapid compromise and the demands of Sudanese citizens who argue that civilians cannot safely return home while RSF forces remain in their communities.

His stance also draws an important distinction between negotiating with the RSF to end the violence and granting it political legitimacy after the fighting stops.

Peace negotiations may require engagement with an armed adversary. They do not necessarily require awarding that adversary government ministries, military authority or control over state institutions. Al-Burhan’s challenge will be to maintain that distinction while demonstrating that the army’s goal is the restoration of a functioning Sudanese state, rather than indefinite military government.

The concerns surrounding the RSF are grounded in extensive allegations documented by international investigators and human rights organizations. The organization has been accused of extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence, arbitrary detention, abductions, looting, the occupation of civilian homes and the forced displacement of communities.

Darfur has suffered some of the war’s worst violence. In its findings concerning El Fasher, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that mass killings and related atrocities committed by the RSF bore hallmarks of genocide. The RSF has denied deliberately targeting civilians or ethnic communities.

These allegations have reinforced the argument advanced by al-Burhan and the army that the RSF cannot simply be restored to its prewar position as a parallel military institution operating alongside the national armed forces.

Sudan’s experience demonstrates the danger of permitting an autonomous paramilitary organization to accumulate its own forces, economic interests and political influence outside the normal institutions of the state. Any settlement that preserves that arrangement risks postponing the conflict rather than resolving it.

Al-Burhan therefore has an opportunity to frame the army’s position around a broader national principle: Sudan should have one professional national military, accountable state institutions and a civilian political system in which no armed group can seize political influence through violence.

That message would have significance beyond the immediate conflict. It would reassure Sudanese civilians that negotiations are not intended merely to divide power between military leaders. It could also give international mediators a more constructive basis for discussions about disarmament, military integration, civilian government and eventual elections.

The approach carries risks. Rejecting an imperfect agreement could prolong the war and deepen Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe. Millions of people have already been displaced, while hunger, disease and the destruction of infrastructure continue to threaten civilians across the country.

International negotiators may also conclude that the RSF must be included in talks because it retains fighters, territory and the capacity to continue the war. Al-Burhan cannot ignore that military reality.

However, inclusion in ceasefire negotiations should not automatically confer a permanent place in Sudan’s political order. A credible agreement must address the withdrawal of fighters from civilian areas, the return of displaced families, the dismantling of parallel military structures and the prosecution of those responsible for serious crimes.

It must also include accountability for violations committed by all parties. International investigators have accused both the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces of breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law. A justice process that investigates only one side would lack credibility and could deepen Sudan’s political divisions.

Acknowledging that obligation would strengthen, rather than weaken, al-Burhan’s position. By supporting impartial investigations while insisting that the RSF cannot retain an independent army or be rewarded for alleged atrocities, he could present the Sudanese Armed Forces as the institution seeking to restore national sovereignty and the rule of law.

Al-Burhan’s leadership will ultimately be judged not only by whether the army defeats its battlefield opponent, but by what kind of political system emerges from the war.

A purely military victory may not deliver lasting stability. A diplomatic agreement that ignores the demands of victims may be equally unsustainable. Sudan needs a settlement that stops the fighting without allowing armed power to replace democratic legitimacy.

That is the defining challenge now confronting al-Burhan: to protect Sudan’s territorial and institutional unity, support a credible transition to civilian government and ensure that peace does not become another name for impunity.

If he can navigate those competing demands, he may help establish a principle essential to Sudan’s future: political authority must come from legitimate institutions and the consent of the Sudanese people, not from violence against them.